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Abstract 
In 2007 and 2008, the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and the deterioration of 
the housing market more generally precipitated a crisis at the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 
which together held or guaranteed $5.3 trillion in mortgage assets. Over the course of two 
years, both entities suffered high losses and saw their liquidity positions deteriorate as the 
market perceived their rapid decline. On September 6, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), pursuant to the authority of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) 
of 2008, took Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship as part of a four-part rescue 
plan designed to prevent their insolvencies as well as the concomitant collapse of the US 
mortgage market. This case study discusses the establishment of the secured Credit Facility, 
which functioned as a liquidity backstop for both entities. Despite having gone unused, the 
facility’s existence assured the liquidity of the two entities and coincided with a resurgence 
in demand for their debt.  
 
1 This case study is one of seven 2021 Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case studies that examine in 
detail the various elements of the government’s rescue of the GSEs: 
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships” by Daniel Thompson 
and Rosalind Z. Wiggins. 
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module B: The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreements (SPSPAs)” by Daniel Thompson. 
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module C: GSE Credit Facility” by Emily Vergara.  
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program” by 
Michael Zanger-Tishler and Rosalind Z. Wiggins. 
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008” by Daniel Thompson. 
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module F: The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset 
Purchase (LSAP) Program” by Daniel Thompson and Adam Kulam. 
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Benjamin 
Henken, Adam Kulam, Daniel Thompson, and Andrew Metrick. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 Emily Vergara - Intern, YPFS, Yale School of Management.   





Keywords: Credit Facility, Fannie Mae, FHFA, Freddie Mac, GSEs, housing crisis, liquidity, 
secondary mortgage market, Treasury 
354






At a Glance  
In 2007 and 2008, the collapse of the 
subprime mortgage market and the 
deterioration of the housing market more 
generally precipitated a crisis at the 
Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 
which collectively held or assured $5.3 
trillion in mortgage assets. Over two years, 
both entities suffered high losses and saw 
their liquidity positions deteriorate as the 
market perceived their rapid decline. On 
September 6, 2008, the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA), pursuant to the 
authority of the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, put Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship 
as part of a four-part rescue plan designed 
to prevent their insolvency as well as the concomitant collapse of the US mortgage market. 
The secured Credit Facility was created to serve as a funding backstop for Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). The facility acted as a channel 
through which Treasury could make unlimited collateralized short-term loans—as 
needed—to both entities through December 31, 2009. Treasury funding was harnessed 
from its accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), which served in a 
custodial role during the program’s existence. Eligible collateral included mortgage-backed 
securities issued by the two entities as well as advances made by the FHLBs. Loans were 
designed to be short-term, with maturities ranging from seven to 30 days. Treasury 
charged interest rates equivalent to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) of 
comparable duration plus a premium of 50 basis points. 
The Credit Facility expired on December 31, 2009, having gone unused. During the Credit 
Facility’s lifetime, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac satisfied their funding requirements using 
other means, including debt issues on the open market and draws from Treasury pursuant 
to the senior preferred stock purchase agreements (SPSPAs). 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To equip Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with 
a full liquidity backstop should they become unable to 
fund themselves on the open market 
Announcement Date  September 06, 2008 
Operational Date September 07, 2008 
Expiration Date  December 31, 2009  
Legal Authority Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of July 
2008, Section 117 
Interest Rate  LIBOR + 50bps 
Eligible Collateral Mortgage-backed 
securities issued by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac and FHLB advances 
Government Sponsor US Treasury  
Participants None 
Total Credit Extended $0  
GSE Credit Facility 
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Because it went unused, the Credit Facility has not received as much attention from 
scholars as have the more prominent features of the government’s four-part intervention 
with respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Nonetheless, the Credit Facility’s mere 
presence assured the liquidity of the two entities at a time of extreme market fragility and 
coincided with a later resurgence in demand for their debt.
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GSE Credit Facility: United States Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
$14,628.0 billion in 2009 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
$47,100 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year 
senior debt)  





Size of banking system  
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in 2009 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP  
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
66.9% in 2009 
Size of banking system assets as a 
percentage of financial system 
assets  
29.0% in 2007 
30.5% in 2008 
30.3% in 2009 
5-bank concentration of banking 
system  
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
44.3% of total banking assets in 2009 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
19% of total banking assets in 2009 
Government ownership of banking 
system  
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2009 
Existence of deposit insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2008 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2009 










The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
that were created to support the secondary mortgage market and to fulfill certain affordable-
housing goals (FCIC 2011a, 38-39). They do this by purchasing whole loans from mortgage 
lenders and compiling them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which they then 
guarantee and sell to investors (FCIC 2011a, 39). The GSEs also retain some of the loans they 
purchase as portfolio investments (FCIC 2011a, 39). The GSEs raise funds by issuing debt, 
which, prior to 2008, had been perceived by markets to be a very safe investment; as a result, 
GSE debt at the time was held by financial institutions and government entities around the 
world (FCIC 2011a, 309).  
By the middle of 2007, issues confined to subprime mortgages had spilled over into the wider 
US mortgage market, causing an overall contraction in private securitization and an increase 
in the share of new mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FCIC 2011b, 311-
312). Not long after, the GSEs started to run into serious problems of their own. Starting in 
late 2007, the two entities began to post huge quarterly losses, with each amassing several 
billions in losses by the middle of 2008 (FCIC 2011b, 309-310). Moreover, as the market 
began to perceive the steep decline of the GSEs, investors started to pull back from their debt 
and capital offerings, while concerns about the GSEs’ solvency abounded (FCIC 2011b, 313-
316). Compounding these worries was the inordinately high leverage of the GSEs (FCIC 
2011b, 309). At the end of 2007, the GSEs were leveraged 75-to-1, holding or assuring $5.3 
trillion of mortgage assets on a collective capital base of only $70.7 billion (FCIC 2011b, 309). 
On September 6, 2008, pursuant to the authority of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
(HERA) of 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), in cooperation with the US 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve, put the GSEs into conservatorship as part of a four-part 
rescue plan designed to prevent their likely insolvency and the concomitant collapse of the 
US mortgage market (Treasury 2008b). Other components of the plan were to: (1) enter into 
senior preferred stock purchase agreements (SPSPAs) with each GSE, (2) establish a secured 
Credit Facility for each GSE, and (3) purchase their mortgage-backed securities (Treasury 
2008b). This case study focuses on the establishment of the GSE Credit Facility. 
Program Description 
The GSE Credit Facility (“the Credit Facility”) was established to provide secured loans—as 
needed—to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), which 
made up the group of government-sponsored enterprises that operated in the US mortgage 
market (Treasury 2008a). Our primary focus herein is to examine the facility with respect to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Much of the discussion that follows, however, also applies to 
the FHLBs. Like the GSEs, no FHLB utilized the facility before it expired on December 31, 
2009 (Frame et al. 2015, 17). 
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Under the Credit Facility, Treasury could extend unlimited funding4 to the GSEs, although—
in keeping with requirements set out by HERA—no loan it issued could mature later than 
December 31, 2009 (Treasury 2008a). By design, the Credit Facility was unlimited, in effect 
allowing it to serve as a full liquidity backstop for the GSEs (Treasury 2008b). 
The Credit Facility offered only short-term loans, usually with maturities ranging from seven 
to 30 days (Treasury 2008a). In the interest of the taxpayer, all loans were required to be 
secured by satisfactory collateral, which Treasury defined as mortgage-backed securities 
issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or FHLB advances (Treasury 2008a). Treasury was 
responsible for setting collateral margins, while FRBNY was responsible for valuing and 
managing the collateral offered by the GSEs (Treasury 2008a; Treasury 2010, GSE-10).  
The Credit Facility charged an interest rate equivalent to the daily London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) plus a premium of 50 basis points, which was meant to protect taxpayers’ 
investment (Treasury 2008a; Treasury 2010, GSE-10). The Treasury Secretary could alter 
the interest rate charged by the Credit Facility as he or she saw fit (Treasury 2008a). 
Treasury funded the Credit Facility using its account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (FRBNY), which served in a custodial role during the program’s existence (Treasury 
2008a). All loan requests were subject to the approval of the Treasury, and the Treasury 
Secretary held the power to set the terms on individual loans (Treasury 2008a). 
Other conditions pertaining to the length and amount of each loan were as follows: 
• “The term of a loan may not be extended, but a maturing loan could be replaced 
with a new loan under the same borrowing procedures as the initial loan.” 
• “Loans could be pre-paid with two days’ notice, and loans could be called 
before their scheduled maturity date.” 
• “Loan amounts would be based on available collateral” (Treasury 2008a). 
Outcomes 
The Credit Facility expired on December 31, 2009, having gone unused by both Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac (Treasury Fact Sheet 2008a; Frame et al. 2015, 17). As it turned out, both 
entities were able to satisfy their liquidity requirements elsewhere on more favorable terms 
(Fannie Mae 2009, 125-126; Freddie Mac 2009, 126-127). 
Even as the Credit Facility went unused, the Treasury remained a primary source of funding 
for the GSEs. From September 2008 through December 2009, the two entities collectively 
drew more than $110 billion from Treasury under the SPSPAs (Thompson 2021, sec. 
“Program Description”). At the end of 2009, Treasury effectively uncapped Treasury’s 
commitment via the SPSPAs, allowing the government to provide unlimited funding to the 
 
4 Funding was subject only to the federal debt ceiling, which was raised by $800 billion with the enactment of 
HERA (FCIC 2011b, 316-317). 
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GSEs from 2010-2012, after which time the funding limit reverted to $200 billion per GSE 
plus any amounts it had drawn during that period (Thompson 2021, sec. “Program 
Description”). This arrangement—made possible by the second amendment to the SPSPAs—
was critical to maintaining confidence in the GSEs, as both the Credit Facility and the MBS 
purchase program were set to expire on December 31 (Thompson 2021, sec. “Program 
Description”; Treasury 2008b). 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Credit Facility derived legal authority from the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008. 
As the housing correction worsened and the outlook for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
deteriorated, government officials ramped up efforts to pass legislation to create a new, 
more powerful GSE regulator with the authority to properly mitigate concerns at the entities 
and to rescue them, if necessary (FCIC 2011b). Government officials worried that the Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight [OFHEO], then the safety and soundness regulator 
of the GSEs, had insufficient authority over the two entities and possessed no viable 
mechanism to rescue the GSEs should they verge on disorderly collapse (FCIC 2011b, 312-
318; Frame et al. 2015, p. 18). 
On July 30, 2008, in response to pleas from federal financial officials, the US government 
adopted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) (FCIC 2011b, 316-317). In addition 
to creating a new, more powerful GSE regulator (FHFA) with the authority to impose higher 
capital standards and to sanction unsafe behavior, HERA also significantly increased the 
government’s capacity to respond to a crisis (FCIC 2011b, 316-317). More specifically, HERA 
granted the Treasury the power to act as a financial backstop for the GSEs, subject only to its 
determination that such an action was necessary to preserve the stability of the mortgage 
market and the financial system more generally (HERA). 
After making such a determination, Treasury could purchase an unlimited amount of the 
GSEs’ capital securities or debt, so long as such purchases took place before December 31, 
2009, when Treasury’s authority to purchase these instruments was set to expire (Treasury 
2008b). In September 2008, Treasury established the Credit Facility, entered into the 
SPSPAs, and launched the GSE MBS purchase program pursuant to the new funding authority 
granted by HERA (Treasury 2008b). 
2. The Credit Facility constituted one part of a four-part rescue plan for Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. 
On September 7, 2008, Treasury and the FHFA announced a four-part rescue plan designed 
to prevent the insolvencies of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as the parallel collapse of 
the mortgage market, consisting of (1) placing the two GSEs into conservatorships, (2) 
entering into the SPSPAs, (3) establishing the Credit Facility for each entity, and (4) 
launching the Treasury GSE MBS purchase program (Treasury 2008b). 
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The rescue plan was designed such that each component addressed a particular set of 
constraints confronting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Treasury 2008b). The role of the 
Credit Facility was to provide a liquidity backstop for the GSEs, ensuring their access to 
stable funding should demand for their debt securities take time to recover (Treasury 
2008b). 
3. Each GSE could borrow an unlimited amount through the Credit Facility. 
Unlike their standing lines of credit from Treasury—which afforded each GSE a maximum of 
$2.25 billion—the Credit Facility offered the GSEs the opportunity to borrow an unlimited 
amount from Treasury, although—in keeping with requirements set by HERA—this funding 
could not extend past December 31, 2009 (Treasury 2007; Treasury 2008b). By design, the 
Credit Facility was unlimited, in effect serving as a full liquidity backstop for the GSEs during 
its lifetime (Treasury 2008b). Although the government never explicitly stated how much it 
realistically would have committed to the GSEs, HERA raised the federal debt limit by $800 
billion (FCIC 2011b, 317). 
4. Treasury charged each GSE a penalty rate on all loans. 
The initial interest rate on loans was set at LIBOR of a comparable duration plus a premium 
of 50 basis points (Treasury 2008a). The rate was set at the discretion of Secretary Paulson 
consistent with the credit line being “an ultimate liquidity backstop” and was intended to 
protect the taxpayers (Treasury 2008a; Treasury 2008b, 3). As a result, the GSEs were 
incentivized to obtain funding elsewhere, if available. As it turned out, the GSEs were able to 
satisfy their funding requirements elsewhere on more favorable terms, and thus never 
utilized the Credit Facility (Fannie Mae 2009, 125-126; Freddie Mac 2009, 126-127).  
5. The Credit Facility was designed to offer only short-term loans. 
Under the Credit Facility, loans could be extended for terms ranging from seven to 30 days 
(Treasury 2008a). The creation of a short-term lending facility reflected Treasury’s attempt 
to address the short-term funding constraints experienced by the GSEs (Treasury 2010, GSE-
3). In addition, the Credit Facility complemented rather than overlapped with funding 
available to the GSEs pursuant to the SPSPAs (Treasury 2008b). At the same time, shorter 
loan terms also functioned to better protect the taxpayer against possible instability 
(Treasury 2010, GSE-3). 
6. Satisfactory collateral was defined as agency mortgage-backed securities issued by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as FHLB advances. 
All loans extended through the facility were required to be secured by satisfactory collateral, 
which Treasury defined only as agency mortgage-backed securities and FHLB advances 
(Treasury 2008a). As of June 30, 2008, the GSEs collectively held more than $600 billion of 
their own securities, thus making the Credit Facility a viable source of substantial funding, if 
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needed5 (Fannie Mae 2008, 91; Freddie Mac 2008, 33). Treasury was responsible for setting 
collateral margins on loans, while the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was responsible for 
valuing and managing the collateral submitted by each GSE. Treasury viewed haircuts to 
collateral as a measure to protect taxpayers from the risk of lending to potentially unstable 
firms (Treasury 2008a; Treasury 2010, GSE-3). 
III. Evaluation 
It is difficult to evaluate the isolated impact of the Credit Facility, as it was just one part of a 
multifaceted rescue plan for the GSEs (Treasury 2008b). Overall, the rescue effort was 
designed to prevent the destabilizing insolvency of the GSEs and to restore their ability to 
fund themselves in the open market (Treasury 2008b). From November 2008 to March 2012, 
the GSEs collectively received $187.5 billion in funding from the federal government, all of 
which they received via the SPSPAs (Thompson 2021, sec. “Outcomes”).  
The Credit Facility expired on December 31, 2009, having gone unused (Fannie Mae 2009, 
28; Freddie Mac 2009, 6). During fiscal year 2009, demand revived for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac debt securities, especially compared with demand during the previous year 
(Fannie Mae 2009, 14; Freddie Mac 2009, 130). During fiscal year 2009, Fannie Mae issued 
nearly $1.7 trillion in gross short- and long-term debt securities, while Freddie Mac issued 
nearly $1 trillion (Fannie Mae 2009, 127; Freddie Mac 2009, 130). The firms have credited 
the government rescue—not only of themselves but also of the broader market—with 
helping to restore confidence in them as well as within markets for their debt securities 
(Fannie Mae 2009, 127-128; Freddie Mac 2009, 129). 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
“Fact Sheet: Government Sponsored Enterprise Credit Facility.” (Treasury 2008a) – 
Document that describes the framework of the Credit Facility.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fact-sheet-government-sponsored-enterprise-credit-
facility 
“Fiscal Year 2010 Congressional Justification: Housing Government Sponsored Enterprise 




Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), sec. 1117, July 30, 2008 – The law 
authorizing the FHFA to place the GSEs in conservatorship in 2008.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/housing-and-economic-recovery-act-2008 
Press Releases/Announcements 
“Paulson Announces GSE Initiatives.” July 31, 2008 – Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., 
communicating the steps created to assist Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4285 
“Paulson’s Announcement on Fannie, Freddie.” (Treasury 2008b) – Treasury Secretary Henry 
M. Paulson, Jr., announces the necessary actions to assist the GSEs.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/paulsons-announcement-fannie-freddie 
“The Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” September 25, 2008 – Statement from 
James B. Lockhart III, director of the FHFA, on the 2008 conservatorship.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/conservatorship-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac 
Media Stories 
 “U.S. Unveils Takeover of Fannie and Freddie,” (NYT 2008)  – States that the Credit Facility 
was implemented to act as a last resort of funding.    
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/us-unveils-takeover-fannie-and-freddie  
Reports 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(FCIC 2011) – Report of the government’s premier commission studying the crisis. Chapter 17 
specifically discusses the rescue.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3366. 
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